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GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS* 
 
Wrongdoing, Culpability and the Logic of Criminal Law 
Defences  
 
 
Abstract. This article examines the question of criminal liability in terms of the theoretical 
distinction between justification and excuse. By contrast with German and other continental 
criminal law systems, the distinction has not played a significant part in the development of 
criminal law doctrine in common law jurisdictions. Over the past twenty years, however, 
there has been a growing interest in the benefits of this approach to conceptualising criminal 
liability, manifested by the considerable literature on justification and excuse and the frequent 
references to the distinction in judicial decisions and legislative enactments. Although the 
distinction has been given a great deal of attention in common law countries in recent years, 
attempts at a systematic classification of criminal law defences on this basis run up against 
serious difficulties. These difficulties have much to do with the fact that elements of both 
justification and excuse often appear to overlap in the moral basis of a legal defence. It is 
argued that, notwithstanding these difficulties, the theory of justification and excuse offers a 
viable model, which can achieve and maintain coherence among criminal law defences and 
facilitate understanding and acceptance of criminal law and its presuppositions. 
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Justifications, excuses and criminal liability  

Criminal law doctrine proceeds from the principle that a person cannot be 
convicted of an offence unless two basic elements are established: the conduct 
or state of affairs which a particular offence prohibits (actus reus), and the 
state of mind which a person must have at the time of such conduct or state of 
affairs (mens rea). Establishing criminal liability depends, moreover, upon the 
absence of a valid legal defence. A distinction is drawn between two types of 
defences: justifications and excuses. A justification-based defence challenges 
the unlawful character of an act which, on the face of it, violates a criminal 
prohibition. When such a defence is raised the argument is that, in the circum-
stances, an act which would normally constitute a criminal offence should be 
considered right or, at least, legally permissible. The circumstances of justifi-
cation, in other words, are understood to alter the grounds for the moral and 
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legal assessment of the relevant act. Self-defence and defence of another are 
often referred to as examples of justification-based legal defences. Claims of 
excuse, by contrast, do not deny the wrongfulness and unlawfulness of the act. 
What these defences call in question is the necessary internal relationship bet-
ween a prima facie unlawful act and the actor. An accused who pleads a valid 
excuse cannot be held morally blameworthy and therefore culpable for having 
brought about the external elements of a criminal offence. Examples of this 
type of legal defence include insanity, duress and certain types of necessity.  
  Central to the theory of justification and excuse is the distinction between 
primary or prohibitory norms and norms of attribution. The former impose 
general duties of conformity with minimum standards of conduct on members 
of society who are required to guide their conduct accordingly if they are to 
avoid the sanctions provided by the law. These primary or prohibitory norms 
are complemented or modified by the norms of justification, which allow for 
exceptions to the application of the primary norms in prescribed circum-
stances. For example, the primary norm against committing acts of violence is 
complemented or modified by the provision which licenses the doing of such 
acts in self-defence or in defence of another. Justifications operate on the 
assumption that, when done under the prescribed circumstances, the act in 
question, harmful though it may be, should be assessed differently than when 
done under normal circumstances, i.e. under those in which the original pro-
hibitory norm would apply. By contrast with the primary or prohibitory norms, 
the norms of attribution are specifically addressed to judges and juries as these 
norms lay down grounds for legally excusing someone who has violated a 
legal prohibition. Unlike claims of justification, the norms of attribution do not 
modify the primary norms. Their role is not to guide conduct but to allow for 
exceptions in ascribing moral blame as a prerequisite for legal culpability. 
According to Professor Fletcher:1 
“Wrongful conduct may be defined as the violation of the prohibitory norm 
as modified by all defences that create a privileged exception to the norm. 
The analysis of attribution turns our attention to a totally distinct set of norms, 
which do not provide directives for action, but spell out the criteria for 
holding persons accountable for their deeds. The distinction as elaborated 
here corresponds to the more familiar distinction between justification and 
excuse.” 

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 As criminal law is concerned not only with punishing wrongdoers but also 
with highlighting and reinforcing societal values and expectations, it should 
be capable of identifying the moral character of actions and the moral basis for 
exempting certain persons accused of offences from criminal liability and 
punishment.2 In this respect, describing a defence as a justification conveys the 
message that the relevant conduct is approved or, at least, tolerated. On the 
other hand, labelling a defence as an excuse draws attention to the fact that, 
although the actor is free from blame, his conduct remains wrongful and as such 
is to be avoided. A failure to recognise the distinction between justification 
and excuse will result in sending confusing or contradictory messages to the 
community.3 Besides its great moral significance, the distinction between 
justification and excuse has important practical implications. It is recognised, 
for example, that as the defence of duress operates as an excuse, a person 
who assists another in the commission of an offence should be convicted as 
an accessory even though the principal offender is excused on such grounds. 
By contrast, other things being equal, an alleged accessory would be free from 
criminal liability if the person accused of an offence as a principal successfully 
pleads a justification-based defence. Moreover, legally justified or authorised 
conduct cannot be resisted by force—e.g. one cannot justifiably use force 
to resist a lawful arrest, for this would undermine the greater interest being 
protected, i.e. the enforcement of the law—and third parties are generally 
entitled to assist a person whose action is deemed justified. On the other hand, 
because excuses do not deny the wrongful character of conduct, a person may 
use force to resist an attack by an excusable aggressor.4 Moreover, whether a 
defence is classified as a justification or as an excuse may have important con-
sequences as regards the issue of compensation of those harmed by the 
accused’s conduct. If the defence is regarded as an excuse a person harmed 
would have a strong claim for compensation. By contrast, if the defence is 

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2
 According to M. Moore, by moral values and expectations we mean those “attitudes 
of resentment, moral indignation, condemnation, approval, guilt, remorse, shame, pride and 
the like, and that range of more cognitive judgments about when an actor deserves moral 
praise or blame.” “Causation and Excuses” (1985), 73 California Law Review, 1091, 1144. 
 
3
 See Robinson, P.: A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for 
Criminal Liability. 23 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review (1975) 266, 
276–277. 
 
4
 See Fletcher: op. cit. 761–762; Alldridge, P.: The Coherence of Defences. [1983] 
Criminal Law Review, 665–666.  
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classified as a justification the victim’s claim for compensation would be 
significantly weaker.5 
 Commentators agree that, by contrast with German and other Continental 
criminal law systems, the distinction between justification and excuse has not 
been given enough weight in the development of modern criminal law 
doctrine in Common law jurisdictions.6 It is argued that much of the confusion 
surrounding criminal law doctrine today could have been avoided had the 
importance of the distinction been recognised at an earlier stage in the develop-
ment of the law.7 Nevertheless, the increasing literature on justification and 
excuse and the frequent references to the relevant distinction in judicial decisions 
and legislative enactments in recent years manifest a renewed interest in the 
benefits of this approach to conceptualising criminal liability.8  
 
 
Justification and excuse in common law jurisprudence  
 
At early common law the distinction between justification and excuse was 
fully recognised and had important practical implications, particularly in the 
context of the law of homicide. A successful justification-based defence 
resulted in the full acquittal of the accused. On the other hand, an excuse-
based defence resulted in the usual sentence for homicide—death—and the 
forfeiture of the accused’s property. The excused person, however, could escape 
execution on the grounds of a royal pardon. The Statute of Gloucester, enacted 

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5
 See Horowitz, D.: Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal Law. 
1986. 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 109–122. 
 
6
 See e.g., Fletcher, G.: The Individualization of Excusing Conditions. Southern 
California Law Review 47, (1974), 1269; The Right and the Reasonable. Harvard Law 
Review (1985), 949; Yeo, S. M. H.: Compulsion in the Criminal Law, 1990, 5. 
 
7
 As Professor Yeo points out: “The criminal theory concerning justification and 
excuse can no longer be ignored by the courts. Its primary contribution is consistency in 
the development of the law, a goal which the courts themselves proclaim as most desirable. 
Without the theory to guide the courts, aspects of the law of self-defence, duress, necessity 
and, until only recently provocation, have developed in an inconsistent fashion.” Yeo, S. 
M. H.: Proportionality in Criminal Defences. Criminal Law Journal 12 (1988), 227. 
 
8
 See e.g. the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Perka v. R. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 
232, 42 C.R. (3D) 112. As Dickson J. pointed out in that case: “Criminal theory recognizes 
a distinction between ‘justifications’ and ‘excuses’. A ‘justification’ challenges the 
wrongfulness of an action which technically constitutes a crime...In contrast, an ‘excuse’ 
concedes the wrongfulness of the action but asserts that the circumstances under which it 
was done are such that it ought not to be attributed to the actor.” ( S.C.R. 247, C.R. 128). 
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in the thirteenth century,9 provided that killing another in self-preservation, 
like the killing of another by misadventure or accident, was excusable and 
therefore subject to royal pardon. The distinction between justifiable and 
excusable homicide was elaborated further by the commentators of the 17th 
and 18th centuries. In his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769), 
William Blackstone distinguished between justifiable homicide as it is 
committed “either for the advancement of public justice or for the prevention 
of some atrocious crime”,10 and excusable homicide which could be of two 
kinds: “either per infortunium, by misadventure; or se defendendo, upon a 
principle of self-preservation.”11 Killing in self-defence was considered 
excusable when two persons became engaged in a fight in the course of which 
deadly violence was used by one of the parties. If the killing took place in the 
heat of the moment, it was called “chance-medley” and the offender was guilty 
of the lesser crime of manslaughter. If, however, the accused had killed the 
other after he had retreated as far as possible, this was excusable homicide se 
defendendo.12  


  
9
 6 Edw. I.c.9 (1278). 
 
10
 Blackstone, W.: Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769), 179. 
 
11
 Ibid. 82. 
 
12
 Francis Bacon was one of the first English writers to comment on the distinction 
between justification and excuse. In discussing what he called “necessity of conservation 
of life” Bacon used as examples the stealing of food by a person to satisfy his present 
hunger and the escaping of prisoners from a jail following an accidental fire. Bacon 
regarded the first of these cases as an example of excusing necessity; however he treated 
the second case as an example of justifying necessity, a view that was to be questioned by 
later writers. Further, Bacon described as justifiable action one’s pulling down the wall or 
house of another to prevent a fire from spreading and as excusable the killing of another by 
misfortune. Bacon, F.: The Elements of the Common Laws of England, (1630), 29 ff. And 
see Coke: The Third Part of the Institutes (1660), 50 ff.; Dalton, M.: Countrey Justice, 
(1619) 224 ff. In his Pleas of the Crown, published in 1678, Hale distinguished between 
three kinds of homicide: “(1) Purely voluntary, viz., murder and manslaughter; (2) purely 
involuntary, as that other kind of homicide per infortunium; (3) mixed, partly voluntary 
and partly involuntary, or in a kind necessary; and this again of two kinds, viz., including a 
forfeiture as se defendendo, or not including a forfeiture as (1) in defence of a man’s 
house; (2) in defence of his person against an assault in via regia; (3) in advancement or 
execution of justice.” (472) Hale differentiated homicides which were “justifiable, and 
consequently including no forfeiture at all, nor needing pardon”, from homicides which 
were “excusable and including a forfeiture.” (39–40). William Hawkins, in his Treatise of 
the Pleas of the Crown (1716), explained justifiable homicide as being “either of a publick 
or a private nature. That of a publick nature, is such as is occasioned by the due execution 
or advancement of publick justice. That of a private nature is such as happens in the just 
defence of a man’s person, house, or goods.” (70). Moreover, he distinguished between 
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 East, in his Pleas of the Crown (1803), offered a more elaborate analysis of 
the distinction between justifiable and excusable homicides. Three kinds of 
homicide ex necessitate were identified: (i) homicides in the advancement of 
justice, deemed justifiable by permission of the law, e.g. where a person 
having authority to arrest or imprison another kills the party who resists arrest 
in a fight; (ii) homicides in execution of justice, regarded as justifiable by the 
command of the law, e.g. the lawful execution of a convicted criminal; and 
(iii) homicides “in defence of person or property under certain circumstances 
of necessity” which are “either justifiable by permission of the law, or only 
excusable.”13 In the third category East included: (i) the justifiable killing of 
another “who comes to commit a known felony with force against his person, 
his habitation, or his property”14; (ii) the excusable killing of another in self-
defence upon a sudden combat, described as homicide se defendendo upon 
chance-medley, and (iii) the killing of a person in circumstances of “dire 
necessity, which is not induced by the fault of either party, where one of two 
innocent men must die for the other’s preservation: this has been held by some 
to be justifiable; perhaps it may more properly be considered as excusable: 
justification is founded upon some positive duty; excuse is due to human 
infirmity.”15 A further kind of excusable homicide, identified by East, was 
homicide by misadventure, which occurs “when a man doing a lawful act, 
without any intention of bodily harm, and using proper precaution to prevent 
danger, unfortunately happens to kill another person.” In East’s time it was 
recognised that in this case the “the jury under the direction of the court may 
                               
two kinds of excusable homicide: per infortunium and se defendendo. “[H]omicide per 
infortunium, or by misadventure...is when a man in doing a lawful act, without any intent 
of hurt, unfortunately chances to kill another...” (73). “[H]omicide se defendendo...seems 
to be where one who has no other possible means of preserving his life from one who 
combats with him on a sudden quarrel, or of defending his person from one who attempts to 
beat him...kills the person by whom he is reduced to such an inevitable necessity.” (74–75). 
See also: Foster, M.: Crown Cases (1762), 273; Stephen, J. F.: A History of the Criminal 
Law of England III, (London 1883); Pollock, F. and Maitland, F.: The History of English 
Law. (2nd ed., 1898), 478–481; Green, T. A.: Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability in 
Medieval England. 1972. 47 Speculum 669, 675 ff; “The Jury and the English Law of 
Homicide, 1200–1600” (1976) 74 Michigan Law Review 413, 428; Kaye, J. M.: The Early 
History of Murder and Manslaughter. 1967. 83 Law Quarterly Review 365 and 569. 
 
13
 220–221. 
 
14
 221. 
 
15
 221. 
WRONGDOING, CULPABILITY AND THE LOGIC OF CRIMINAL LAW DEFENCES 73 
   
acquit the party, without putting him to purchase a pardon under the statute of 
Gloucester, c.9.” 16 
 Although at first pardons were granted in special occasions, their number 
gradually increased until they came to be granted by the chancellor as a matter 
of course, without the need to consult the monarch. Until the pardon was 
confirmed, the excusable offender remained in jail or, in later years, under bail. 
Besides the pardon, the excused offender was granted a special writ of 
restitution of his goods. Gradually the practice relating to the forfeiture of the 
offender’s goods fell into abeyance, until 1828 when forfeiture was formally 
abolished by statute.17 Thus, at the end, both justifications and excuses led to 
the same result, namely the accused’s acquittal. As the difference between the 
effects of pleading a justification and an excuse gradually disappeared, the 
significance of the distinction for the common lawyer withered away and its 
possible role in formulating a comprehensive system of criminal law defences 
was subsequently overlooked. The terms justification and excuse have often 
been avoided by common lawyers and, when they have been used by judges and 
commentators, they have often been treated as interchangeable or synony-
mous.
18
 The view that came to prevail in English criminal law is that the 
absence of a justification or an excuse constitutes part of the legal definition of 
a criminal offence. According to this approach, when a person acts under a 
valid justification or excuse he cannot commit the offence charged. Some 
authors subsume the absence of such a defence under the requirement of actus 
reus, while others regard it as an independent definitional requirement that 
should be distinguished from the actus reus and mens rea elements of the 
offence.19 Under the latter view, a distinction should be drawn between 

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16
 221–222. 
 
17
 9 Geo. IV c. 1, s. 10 (1828).  
 
18
 As one commentator remarked: “[T]he distinction between justifiable and excusable 
self-defence was, at one time, one of considerable importance. Moreover, it is still 
occasionally referred to in the cases and the two are still separately classified in the texts. 
However, so far as the present day law is concerned, the distinction is one without a 
difference... The terms are generally used synonymously and interchangeably.” Miller, J.: 
Handbook of Criminal Law, 1934, 199. And see Stephen: History of the Criminal Law… 
op. cit. III, 1883, 1. 
 
19
 Glanville Williams, for example, argues that: “[the] actus reus includes not merely 
the whole objective situation that has to be proved by the prosecution, but also the absence 
of any ground of justification and excuse.” Criminal Law: The General Part, 1961, 20. 
And according to Hart, H. L. A.: “[The modern English lawyer] would simply consider 
both [excuse and justification] to be cases where some element, negative or positive, 
required in the full definition [of the offence] was lacking.” Hart goes on to point out, 
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excusing conditions negating the actus reus and/or mens rea elements of 
offences (e.g. automatism, mistake), and excusing conditions operating outside 
these elements (for example, duress, necessity). In the latter case the actor 
brings about the actus reus of an offence with the requisite intent, but criminal 
responsibility is precluded or diminished (in the case of a partial excuse) on 
the basis that, in the overwhelming circumstances the actor found himself in, 
his normal capacity to choose the course of his action was vitiated or sub-
stantially impaired. Sometimes the statutory definition of an offence includes 
the phrase “without lawful authority or excuse”. It is suggested that the aim of 
this phrase is to serve as a reminder to judges and juries that the application of 
the provision creating the offence is not absolute but always subject to the 
absence of a recognised general defence. On the other hand, the use of the 
phrase “without reasonable excuse” instead of “lawful excuse” in the legal 
definition of an offence implies that, at the court’s discretion, the accused may 
rely on an excuse not formally recognised by the criminal law, provided that 
such an excuse is reasonable.20  
  Professor George Fletcher has offered an important lead in re-awakening 
interest in the distinction between justification and excuse in Anglo-American 
criminal jurisprudence. Fletcher traces the decline of the distinction to the 
prevalence of positivistic ideas in the development of modern law. He argues 
that the judges’ tendency to abstract the judicial decision from the individual 
case in order to formulate general rules of law resulted in the overlooking of 
the fundamental character of criminal law as “an institution of blame and 
punishment”.21 According to Fletcher criminal condemnation and punishment 
presuppose a negative moral judgment of the actor’s character as reflected in 
her voluntary violation of a criminal prohibition. From this viewpoint, excuses 
are seen as introducing exceptions in the application of the rules of positive 
law, for their role is to block the normal inference from a wrongful act that the 
actor’s character is morally flawed. Such moral assessment of the accused’s 
                               
however, that “...the distinction between these two different ways in which actions may 
fail to constitute a criminal offence is still of great moral importance”. Hart, H. L. A.: 
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment. In.: Punishment and Responsibility, 
1968, 13. 
 
20
 Smith, J. C.: Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: The Hamlyn Lectures, 
1989, 47 ff.  
 
21
 Fletcher: Rethinking… op. cit. 467. See also his article “The Individualization of 
Excusing Conditions”, Southern California Law Review 47, (1974), 1269. 
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character is essential to any theory of criminal liability that connects the 
application of criminal punishment with the principle of just deserts.22  
 Fletcher argues, moreover, that the common law’s reliance on the concept 
of reasonableness, as providing a single standard for dealing with legal 
disputes, tends to overshadow the distinction between justification and excuse. 
The common law approach is characteristic of what he calls a “flat” legal 
discourse—a system in which all the criteria pertinent to the resolution of a 
legal problem revolve around the application of a single norm. In Fletcher’s 
words:23 
“The reasonable person enables us to blur the line between justification and 
excuse, between wrongfulness and blameworthiness, and thus renders 
impossible any ordering of the dimensions of liability. The standard ‘what 
would a reasonable person do under the circumstances?’ sweeps within one 
inquiry questions that would otherwise be distinguished as bearing on 
wrongfulness or blameworthiness. Criteria of both justification and excuse 
are amenable to the same question.” 
 Fletcher contrasts the common law approach with what he terms “struc-
tured” legal discourse, and points to the German law as an example. In this 
context legal disputes are resolved in two stages. The admission of an absolute 
norm, at the first stage of analysis, is followed by the introduction of 
qualifications introducing restrictions to the application of the norm, at the 
second. The distinction between justification and excuse is most at home in a 
system which adopts such a structured approach to defining and tackling legal 
disputes. In such a system, the question of wrongfulness of an act logically 
precedes the question of its attribution to the actor. Questions of justification, 
as pertinent to the issue of wrongdoing, take precedence over questions of 
excuse. This structured approach to criminal liability, Fletcher argues,24 is 
consistent with a theory of criminal responsibility that lays special emphasis 
on retributive punishment and the principle of just deserts. From the viewpoint 
of retributive theory, the question of whether the actor deserves punishment 
cannot be considered before determining the wrongdoing to be punished. As 

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22
 Fletcher: Rethinking… op. cit. 800. See also Bayles, M.: Character, Purpose and 
Criminal Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 1, (1982), 5–20. 
 
23
 Fletcher: The Right and the Reasonable. op. cit. 949, 962–963. 
 
24
 Fletcher: Rethinking… op. cit. 961. For an interesting account of the role of excuses 
from the viewpoint of retributive theories of punishment see Dressler, J.: Reflections on 
Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code. Rutgers 
Law Journal 19 (1988), 671. 
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related to the requirement of just deserts, claims of excuse become relevant 
following an admission that a wrongful act has been committed. 
  By contrast with the general trend in modern common law jurisprudence, 
the distinction between justification and excuse has been instrumental in the 
formation of criminal law doctrine in Germany and other Continental European 
jurisdictions. A general account of the distinction as developed in German 
criminal law theory is offered in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
Justification and excuse in German criminal law theory 
 
In Germany and other Continental European legal systems legal doctrine is 
permeated by the fundamental idea that the normative principles of law are not 
reducible to the body of enacted legal rules, or law in a strict sense (Gesetz). 
According to Kant, the transcendental conception of law, captured in the 
notion of Right (Recht), pertains to the conditions of freedom that allow 
diverse choices in society to harmonise with each other.25 Right, or law in a 
broad sense, derives its binding force from its content; enacted law derives its 
binding force from its form-from the fact that its rules have been duly enacted 
by a legislative authority. The principles of the Right are perceived as pre-
existing and transcending the body of enacted rules whose role is merely to lay 
down what is to happen when the former principles are violated. An enacted 
rule, which by definition pertains to a specific type of legal relationship, draws 
on the Right, but cannot be identified with it-it is only a vinculum iuris, a bond 
based on Right. The application of a legal rule is typically strict, for the act or 
dispute is treated under the conditions specified by the letter of the law, 
without taking into account the circumstances of the individual case. By 
contrast, the application of the Right is flexible and as such adaptable to the 
needs of each particular case. Unlawfulness is defined primarily in relation to 
the Right, for an unlawful act is taken to encroach upon the normative 
principles which inform the particular legal provision under which the act is 
subsumed.26 The distinction between Right, or law in a normative sense and 
enacted, posited law is characteristic of continental jurisprudence.27 The 


 
25
 Kant, I.: The Metaphysical Elements of Justice; and see Fletcher: The Right and the 
Reasonable. op. cit. 965; Fletcher: Rethinking… op. cit. 779 ff.  
 
26
 See Jescheck: Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil (2nd ed. 1972), 154. 
 
27
 Thus the Germans distinguish between Gesetz and Recht, the French between Loi 
and Droit, the Italians between Legge and Dirrito, the Russians between Zakon and 
Pravo, the Greeks between Nomos and Dikaeon.  
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prevalence of positivistic views in Anglo-American jurisprudence precluded a 
similar distinction from being recognised in common law jurisdictions. The 
distinction between Right, or law in a broad normative sense, and enacted law, 
as elaborated by the jurist Karl Binding,28 allowed German theory to advance a 
conception of unlawfulness that goes beyond the statutory definition of a 
criminal offence. This development was, in turn, essential, to distinguishing 
between unlawfulness and guilt and, subsequently, between justification and 
excuse. 
 In German legal thinking the theory of justification and excuse emerged 
from the elaboration of the fundamental distinction between wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness. Although initially expressed in these general moral terms, 
this distinction was brought closer to law through a contrast between unlaw-
fulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) and guilt (Schuld).29 The latter distinction was first 
recognised in the domain of private law and was subsequently introduced in 
criminal law theory.30 This development is associated with the emergence of 
the so called ‘tripartite’ system in German criminal law theory. Crime was 
described as an act which a) meets the statutory definition of an offence 
(Tatbestandsmassigkeit), b) is objectively unlawful (Rechtswidrig) and c) can 
be subjectively attributed to the actor (Schuldhaft).31 From this viewpoint, guilt 
was described as the subjective or internal relationship between the actor and 
the prescribed harm and as such it was distinguished from the objective or 
external unlawfulness of the act. The subjective link between the actor and the 
harm captured in the notion of guilt pertains to the elements of intention, 
recklessness and negligence. This interpretation became known as the 

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28
 Binding, K.: 1 Die Normen und ihre Übertretung 135 (1872). Binding’s second 
important contribution to the theory of criminal liability was his analysis of guilt in 
terms of intention, recklessness and negligence, an approach that was widely adopted by 
later jurists.  
 
29
 See Achenbach: Historische und dogmatische Grundlagen der strafrechtssystema-
tischen Schuldlehre (1974) 19 ff.; Jescheck, supra note 26, 153 ff.  
 
30
 As Jhering, R. first explained, the negation of the subjective blameworthiness of 
the actor does not necessarily preclude the wrongful act from having certain legal 
consequences. Das Schuldmoment im Römischen Privatrecht 4, (1867); for a fuller 
discussion of this matter see Eser, A.: Justification and Excuse. American Journal of 
Comparative Law 24 (1976), 625. 
 
31
 As proposed first by Beling, E. in his Lehre vom Verbrechen (1906) and elaborated 
by Liszt, V. in his Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts (1919) 110 ff.; For an interesting 
discussion of this approach to criminal liability see Fletcher, G.: The Right Deed for the 
Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr Robinson. 23 University of California at Los Angeles Law 
Review (1975) 293, reprinted in Michael Louis Corrado (ed), Justification and Excuse in 
the Criminal Law, 1994, 305. 
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“psychological” theory of guilt.32 In criticising the tripartite system, some 
authors have argued that the satisfaction of the formal requirements of a legal 
provision is but another condition of unlawfulness. These authors have 
proposed, instead, a twofold approach to criminal liability based solely on the 
distinction between unlawfulness and guilt.33  
  The clear-cut dichotomy between objective, i.e. pertinent to unlawfulness, 
and subjective, i.e. pertinent to guilt, aspects of crime was finally set aside in 
the light of subsequent developments in German criminal theory. Jurists 
recognised that unlawfulness cannot be adequately canvassed without reference 
to certain subjective requirements. Thus, knowledge on the part of the actor 
that his conduct met the objective conditions of lawfulness was seen as a 
further condition of legal justification. Moreover, it was accepted that the 
notion of guilt hinges not only on subjective but also on objective conside-
rations. The introduction of an objective element in relation to guilt meant that a 
claim denying attribution of an unlawful act to an accused was to be assessed 
also by reference to the question of what could reasonably be expected of a 
normal person when faced with the circumstances of pressure the accused 
found himself in. As a result of this development, the “psychological” theory 
of guilt was abandoned in favour of the so called “normative” theory of guilt.34 
According to the latter theory, the requirements of guilt are not restricted to 
intention, recklessness and negligence, but include, in addition, considerations 
of capacity and control. Lack or substantial impairment of the actor’s ability to 
comply with the law would exclude or mitigate guilt, notwithstanding his 
acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently. Nevertheless, the tripartite 
approach to criminal liability, despite the criticisms and further refinements it 
was subjected to, continued to be regarded as the basis of legal doctrine in 
German criminal jurisprudence. 
 James Goldschmidt was the first jurist to offer a convincing analysis of justi-
fication and excuse in German criminal jurisprudence. His theory proceeds from 
the fundamental distinction between legal norm (Rechtsnorm) and norm of 
responsibility (Pflichtnorm).35 According to Goldschmidt, a formally expressed 
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 Eser, A.: op. ci.t. 626–627. 
 
33
 See e.g. Schmidhauser: Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, (2nd ed.), 1975, 141 ff. See 
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 Goldschmidt, J.: Der Notstand, ein Schuldproblem. 4 Osterr. Zeitschrift fur 
Strafrecht (1913), 144 ff.  
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legal norm, i.e. a statutory provision, is tacitly complemented by a norm of 
responsibility requiring one to regulate her internal stance so that his actions 
do not conflict with the legal norm. The distinction between justification and 
excuse is attuned to that between legal norm and norm of responsibility. Claims 
of justification dispute the unlawful character of a prima facie infringement of a 
legal norm; claims of excuse, in contrast, challenge the violation of a norm of 
responsibility, i.e. the required correspondence between internal attitude and 
external conduct according to a legal norm. In cases of justification criminal 
liability is excluded by virtue of what Goldschmidt calls a “greater objective 
interest”. In cases of excuse, on the other hand, it is excluded by virtue of an 
“irresistible subjective motivation”. The distinction between justification and 
excuse, as articulated by Goldschmidt, was subjected to further theoretical 
elaboration and refinement and is now fully recognised in German criminal 
law. Thus, under the new German Penal Code, enacted in 1975, self-defence is 
regarded as a justification.36 The defence of necessity is treated under two 
separate headings: necessity as a justification,37 and necessity as an excuse.38  
 
 
The theory of justification and excuse as a basis for 
the classification of criminal law defences 
 
The distinction between justification and excuse offers a basic theoretical 
formula for understanding the way criminal law defences operate. One may 
seek to explain, on this basis, the demarcation of different defences as well as 
of different ways in which a legal defence operates or, to put it otherwise, of 
different pleas treated under the same label. From this viewpoint one may 
distinguish, for example, between self-defence as a justification and duress as 
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 Para 32 (Self-defence) provides: “(1) Whoever commits an act in self-defence 
does not act unlawfully. (2) Self-defence is that defence which is required in order to 
prevent a present unlawful attack on oneself or another.”  
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 Para 34 (Necessity as justification) provides: “Whoever commits an act in order to 
avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, liberty, honor, 
property or other legal interest of himself or of another does not act unlawfully if, taking 
into account all the conflicting interests, especially the legal ones, and the degree of 
danger involved, the interest protected by him significantly outweighs the interest which 
he harms. The rule applies only if the act is an appropriate means to avert the danger.” 
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 Para 35 (Necessity as excuse) provides: “(1) Whoever commits an unlawful act in 
order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to his own life, limb, or 
liberty, or to that of a relative or person close to him, acts without guilt...” 
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an excuse, as well as between justifying and excusing necessity.39 Although, at 
a theoretical level, the distinction between justification and excuse presents 
few difficulties, attempts at a general classification of the criminal law defences 
along these lines come up against a number of problems. These problems have 
much to do with the fact that, in practice, elements of excuse often appear to 
overlap with elements of justification. According to Greenawalt40  
 “The difficulty in distinguishing rests on the conceptual fuzziness of the 
terms ‘justification’ and ‘excuse’ in ordinary usage and on the uneasy quality 
of many of the moral judgments that underlie decisions that behavior should 
not be treated as criminal. Beyond these conceptual difficulties, there are 
features of the criminal process, notably the general verdict rendered by lay 
jurors in criminal trials, that would impede implementation in individual 
cases of any system that distinguishes between justification and excuse.” 
Greenawalt argues that there is little room for a systematic classification of 
criminal law defences on the basis of the justification-excuse distinction in 
Anglo-American law, although he does not deny the importance of the 
distinction in elucidating problems of moral and criminal responsibility.  
 Necessity offers an example of a defence whose rationale may be seen as 
resting upon both justificatory and excusative considerations. Necessity relates 
to situations where a person is forced to commit an offence in order to avoid a 
greater, imminent threat to himself or another. What distinguishes this defence 
from that of duress is that the danger which compels a person to break the law 
arises from the circumstances the person finds himself in, rather than from the 
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 As Robinson notes, it is possible to recognise “two different categories of defense 
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49 Law and Contemporary Problems 89. And see Eric Colvin, Principles of Criminal 
Law, 1991, 204–205.  
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threats of another human being.41 Although, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, 
necessity is traditionally recognised as an excuse,42 questions of justification 
may still arise in so far as the person is still regarded as being capable of 
exercising a degree of choice. Thus, in English law, when an accused pleads 
necessity the jury are directed to consider these two interrelated questions: a) was 
the accused compelled to act as he did because he had a good reason to believe 
that otherwise he or another person would suffer death or grievous bodily harm? 
and b) if so, would a reasonable person, sharing the relevant characteristics of 
the accused, have responded to the situation the way the accused did?43 The first 
of these questions is concerned with the subjective condition of compulsion, 
and as such it pertains to excuse; the second is concerned with the requirement 
of proportionality, or the objective appropriateness of the accused’s conduct in 
the circumstances, and as such it relates to justification. The defence may be 
available only if, from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said to have 
acted reasonably and proportionately in order to avoid the forms of harm 
specified, i.e. death and serious bodily injury. A similar position was adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Perka v. R.44 In that case it was held that 
necessity should be recognised as an excuse, as a concession to human frailty, 
and therefore it implies no vindication of the accused’s actions. At the same 
time, however, it was stated that the defence requires a balancing of harms and 
that a plea of necessity should fail unless the harm inflicted was less than the 
harm prevented. According to this interpretation of the necessity defence, the 
success of the proposed compulsion-based excuse depends upon objective or 
justificatory considerations.  
 Similarly, the defence of self-defence, which is traditionally treated as a 
justification, may also be conceptualised as an excuse if the emphasis is placed 
on the assumption that a person whose life is under immediate threat is 
incapable of exercising free choice, i.e. acts morally involuntarily.45 This 
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interpretation of the defence may also be adopted in cases where force in self-
defence is used against an excusable aggressor, e.g. an insane person or a child. 
In such cases the aggressor’s culpability in starting the fight can no longer be 
said to render the aggressor’s rights less worthy of protection. Further, it is 
recognised that when the defence of self-defence is raised, a mistaken belief as 
to the existence or intensity of an attack and/or the psychological pressure an 
accused was experiencing in the circumstances (excuses) are usually taken into 
account in deciding whether his response was reasonable and therefore 
justified.46 What is known as “putative self-defence” offers another example of 
a defence whose rationale involves an overlap of justificatory and excusative 
considerations. In English law, when an accused is charged with an offence 
against the person and pleads self-defence or defence of another, he will be 
judged in the light of the circumstances as he believed them to be. The 
accused’s belief need only be honest, not reasonable.47 What this means is that, 
even if the accused’s actions were based on a mistaken assessment of the 
situation, his response will be deemed justified if the force used was reasonable 
in the light of that mistaken belief. It is obvious that here an excusing 
condition, i.e. mistake of fact, becomes an element of self-defence as a 
justification-based defence. One may argue, however, that in such cases the 
accused’s initial mistake converts the entire defence into an excuse. From this 
viewpoint it may be said that only where the use of force, as well as the 
amount of force used, is objectively warranted one may speak of self-defence 
as a justification.48 On the other hand, it has been argued that, in moral 
discourse, the justification of an action is seen as depending not only on its 
consequences but, more importantly, on the propriety of the reasons for which 
the action is taken. If the emphasis is placed on this letter element, then we 
                               
in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking. University of 
California at Los Angeles Law Review 32 (1984), 61. 
 
46
 See e.g. Lord Morris’ judgment in Palmer v. The Queen [1972] A.C. 814. 
 
47
 R v Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411 (CA); Beckford v. R. [1988] AC 130. The 
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may speak of a person as acting justifiably irrespective of whether her actions, 
in view of their consequences, are objectively justified or not.49 
 Elements of justification and excuse also appear to overlap in some cases 
where a mitigating or partial defence is raised. A plea for mitigation may be at 
issue, for example, where an accused’s defence of self-defence has failed on 
the grounds that the amount of force used was unreasonable or excessive. In 
such a case the accused may seek to rely on a partial excuse, claiming that 
under the pressure of the circumstances it was very difficult for him to assess 
correctly the amount of force needed to stifle the attack; or he may seek to rely 
on a partial justification, claiming that the fact that he was defending against 
an unlawful attack is sufficient to diminish the objective wrongfulness of his 
response. A similar overlap of excusative and justificatory elements is apparent 
in relation to the partial defence of provocation. Provocation, when pleaded 
as a partial defence to murder in English law, is not aimed at complete 
exoneration but only at the reduction of homicide from murder to manslaughter. 
Conceptually, the defence is understood to hinge upon two interrelated 
requirements, namely the wrongful act of provocation and impaired volition or 
loss of self-control. If the emphasis is placed on the assumption that the 
accused was acting in response to the victim’s wrongdoing, the defence could 
be regarded as a partial justification. If, on the other hand, the emphasis is 
placed on the fact that the accused had lost self-control at the time of the 
killing, the defence would appear to operate as a partial excuse. As J. Dressler 
remarks50 
“Confusion surrounds the provocation defence. On the one hand, the 
defence is a concession to human weakness; the requirement that the 
defendant act in sudden heat of passion finds its roots in excuse theory. On 
the other hand the wrongful conduct requirement may be, and certainly 
some decisions based on that element are, justificatory in character. It is 
likely that some of the confusion surrounding the defence is inherent to the 
situation, but it is also probably true that English and American courts were 
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insufficiently concerned about the justification-excuse distinctions while 
the law developed.” 
 The main obstacle to drawing a clear distinction between justifications and 
excuses is that, in the moral discourse, warranted conduct ranges from that 
which might properly be approved and encouraged through that which might 
only be accepted to what might be tolerated as a regrettable but unavoidable 
consequence of the interplay of human nature and circumstance. Anglo-
American law has attempted to circumvent these problems of moral shading by 
avoiding framing legal defences in terms of justification and excuse, placing the 
emphasis, instead, on the all-embracing requirement of reasonableness.  
 
 
Excuse, justification and the reasonable person 
 
The mythical figure of the “reasonable person” maintains a tenacious hold on 
Anglo-American criminal law doctrine. As Fletcher points out, law’s recourse 
to the standard permits a continuous infusion of commonly accepted moral 
values into the law and, as such, constitutes an effort to go beyond the formal 
sources of the criminal law and to reach for “a higher, enduring, normative 
plane”.51 This understanding of the “reasonable person” gains support in the 
light of the ever-increasing tendency towards leaving questions of reasonable-
ness to be determined by the jury, the embodiment of community values and 
expectations. Nonetheless, one could not easily account for those moral 
considerations which underpin the “reasonable person” as the basis of a 
generally applicable test, nor could one prescribe the nature of the disputes to 
be resolved on such a basis. According to Fletcher, the law’s reliance on the 
“reasonable person” means that heterogeneous criteria of justification and 
excuse, of wrongfulness and blameworthiness, are subsumed under the same 
inquiry and this makes it difficult to demarcate between fundamentally different 
perspectives of liability.  
 Nevertheless, the role of the “reasonable person” may be interpreted in 
different ways, depending on the nature of the inquiry within which the relevant 
standard operates. With regard to inquiries of justification, the “reasonable 
person” indicates the course of action that should be re–garded, in the circum-
stances, as legally permissible. In this respect the “reasonable person” embodies 
the moral principles that inform and support judgments of legal justification, 
recognising exceptions to the primary or prohibitory rules of the criminal law. 
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In this context reasonableness defines the required levels of vigilance, prudence 
and regard for the welfare of others which need to be met for conduct to be 
considered justifiable. Thus, in a situation wherein a conflict of values or 
interests becomes inevitable the actor is called on to act as a reasonable person, 
that is to preserve the value or interest which is considered as being objectively 
superior. From the point of view of the justification theory, such an act, 
harmful though it may be, should nonetheless be considered legally acceptable. 
Further, causing harm in pursuance of a legal right, e.g. the right of self-
defence, would not be legally warranted unless the actor observes certain 
limitations or, one might say, does not act “in abuse” of the right. In this regard 
the “reasonable person” is referred to as relevant to circumscribing the bounds 
within which a legal right is regarded as being properly exercised.  
 With regard to inquiries of excuse, on the other hand, the central question 
is whether the actor is fairly expected to stand up to the pressure of the 
circumstances and refrain from acting wrongfully. The “reasonable person” 
provides a yardstick in answering this question. In this context the standard of 
reasonableness is based on a minimalist conception of ethics. What is excluded 
from criminal responsibility is conduct that meets common sense expectations 
as to what degree of pressure ordinary people, concerned for the welfare of 
others, should be able to stand up to, even though such conduct may be 
regrettable from an idealistic viewpoint. In the context of excuse theory, the 
interpretation of the standard is for the most part informed by considerations 
having to do with what is often referred to as the “realities” or “failings” of 
human nature. The slide from the notion of “reasonable” to that of “ordinary” or 
“average” or “normal” person is sometimes suggestive of a shift from 
justification to excuse, as the latter notions seem more apposite to accommodate 
the element of human frailty.52  
 Although legal excuses are said to constitute concessions to the failings of 
human nature because it is assumed that these failings are common to all 
people, the combination of factors that occasion a person’s surrender to 
pressure, as a manifestation of human frailty, could only be determined by 
reference to the idiosyncrasies of the particular case. Thus it becomes necessary 
to endow the “reasonable person” with certain individual characteristics of the 
accused, i.e. those that are deemed relevant to determining, in an objective 
way, the degree of pressure to which the actor was subjected. Only on such a 
basis may it properly be asked whether the accused should fairly be expected 
to resist the pressure and abstain from breaking the law. Of the characteristics 
that may bear upon the actor’s capacity to withstand the compelling situation 
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only those for which he cannot be blamed may be taken into account in 
describing the ambit of the applicable test. The singling out of those individual 
characteristics that are material to the assessment of the proposed excuse can 
itself be perceived as a involving an objective moral judgment. In this respect, 
it seems correct to say that incorporating certain personal characteristics of the 
actor into the “reasonable person” standard does not in reality undermine the 
basically objective character of the relevant test.53 A clear distinction should be 
drawn, however, between individual peculiarities that may be attributed to 
the “reasonable person” and peculiarities whose presence would render the 
standard inapplicable. The latter pertain to conditions which are taken to 
remove the actor from the category of “reasonable” or “normal” people. As was 
indicated before, these conditions provide the basis for a different type of legal 
defence revolving around the notion of abnormality of mind rather than a 
general assumption of human frailty.54  
 
 
Concluding note 
 
At the heart of the theory of justification and excuse lie questions that have 
been the focus of moral philosophy for centuries. And the difficulties in 
categorising legal defences have largely to do with the confusion surrounding 
the choice of the moral theory upon which the role of legal defences is to be 
explained and justified. From the viewpoint of consequentialism, conduct is 
evaluated by reference to its effects. In this respect defences such as necessity 
and duress bear closer to justifications, for the emphasis is on whether the 
harm prevented by the relevant conduct outweighs the harm caused. On the 
other hand, the classification of the same defences as excuses reflects a 
nonconsequentialist, deontological approach which stresses a person’s duty to 
abstain from performing certain actions that constitute violations of moral 
standards. For a deontologist, such actions remain wrongful, irrespective of 
their consequences, and the only way for exculpating the actor would be on the 
basis of an excuse. As this suggests, the same defence could be regarded as a 
justification or as an excuse, depending upon the moral viewpoint which one 
adopts. 
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 Notwithstanding the apparent difficulties in formulating a comprehensive 
system of defences on the basis of the distinction between justification and 
excuse, the increased emphasis on the distinction in recent years has enabled 
courts and legislatures to achieve a greater measure of consistency in Anglo-
American criminal law.55 The distinction has provided judges with a valuable 
tool in elucidating problems of criminal liability and in interpreting and 
declaring the law in a way that reflects more accurately community values and 
expectations. In the work of codification of the criminal law, legislatures rely 
on the distinction as a useful guide towards achieving and maintaining 
coherence and clarity of definition. The analysis of existing and future defence 
categories in terms of the theory of justification and excuse is important in 
bringing the criminal law closer to the community’s moral values and 
expectations and securing a greater degree of comprehension and acceptance 
of the law. The theory offers a viable normative model which can achieve and 
maintain coherence among criminal law defences and secure community 
understanding and acceptance of the presuppositions upon which the criminal 
law system operates. This is because the very focus of the theory is on the 
question of rightness or wrongness of actions and society’s expectations in 
dealing with the authors of such actions. Attention to the theory of justification 
and excuse will warrant the legitimacy and institutional efficacy of the 
criminal law system as a system which derives its aims and guiding purposes 
from the society which it serves. 
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